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Linguistic relativism:  
logic, grammar, and arithmetic in cultural comparison 
 
Abstract  
Linguistic relativism is the thesis that the grammatical structures of different languages 
imply different conceptions of reality. In this paper we critically discuss one form of 
linguistic relativism, which argues that grammatical differences between the English and 
Yoruba language exhibit differences in how English and Yoruba speakers ‘see’ reality 
(namely in terms of ‘spatiotemporal particulars’ and ‘sortal particulars’ respectively). 
We challenge the idea that linguistic relativism is an empirical thesis, i.e., a thesis that is 
substantiated through anthropological examples. We show that linguistic relativism is 
based on two assumptions: firstly, that the purpose of language is to describe the world; 
secondly, that being able to speak presupposes an ontological theory of the ultimate 
constituents of the world.  We argue that the attempt to extract the outline of that theory 
from the language inevitably distorts the portrayal of language-using practice itself.  
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Introduction 
This article contributes to a critical analysis of some empirical examples that are given in 
support of cultural relativism, which we take to be the thesis that logic, grammar, and 
arithmetic are, in some sense, relative or only locally valid.  Our interest lies in showing 
how hard it is to pin down just what ‘in some sense’ amounts to. In this paper we will 
focus on language and linguistic relativism1. As will be seen, however, the discussion 
modulates into a discussion of arithmetic, since the arguments about the relativity of 
language are used to motivate a case about the relativity of number.  
The kind of linguistic relativism considered here involves the assumption that different 
grammatical structures and vocabularies imply different conceptual schemes or 
metaphysics, which postulate the ultimate constituents of the material world.  For 
example, according to Whorf: 
[…] the Hopi language and culture conceals a metaphysics, such as our 
so called naive view of space and time does, or as the relativity theory 
does; yet it is a different metaphysics from either (Whorf, 1956, p.58). 
In other words, linguistic relativism is less interested in language per se than in 
investigating which ultimate constituents of the world are identified ‘in’ the language.  
The relativist’s engagement with language is metaphysically motivated, based on the 
Whorfian assumption that each language accommodates a distinctive, unified 
metaphysics. This licenses the supposedly startling conclusion that inhabitants of 
different language communities inhabit worlds consisting of different kinds of things: 
                                                 
1 In companion papers we discuss mathematical relativism (Greiffenhagen and Sharrock, 2006) and logical 
relativism (Greiffenhagen and Sharrock, forthcoming). 
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When [Whorf] uses [...] phrases [such as] ‘dissect nature’ and ‘the 
categories and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena’, he 
is not thinking of fish and fowl or flora and fauna; he is thinking, rather, 
of the metaphysical categories: thing, event, relation, substance, quality, 
action, past, present, future, and so on.  These are the categories into 
which languages ‘dissect nature’, and Whorf's relativism is the claim 
that languages differ in the way in which they deploy such categories. 
(Cook, 1978b, p.5) 
We take it as plain that there are differences between languages, e.g., in their grammatical 
structures or vocabularies. However, we question whether this necessarily implies 
variable metaphysical commitments on the part of speakers of different languages.  The 
reason for this is not because we think that the metaphysics are uniform across languages, 
but because we wonder (following Wittgenstein and Cook) whether speaking a language 
depends on a metaphysics in the first place. In other words, the question for us is not 
whether there are differences between languages (of course there are), but what this 
signifies, especially whether epistemological or ontological implications comparisons can 
be made of the basis of them – without, that is, the importation of questionable (at least 
contestable) philosophical assumptions to license reading these metaphysical implications 
into the materials2.  Thus we agree with Cook who notes: 
It is, of course, an empirical fact that spoken languages do differ greatly 
in grammatical structure, but it is an a priori philosophical claim that 
one can read off a metaphysics from grammatical structure. (Cook, 
1978a, p.13) 
In our view, the project of linguistic relativism only works by making several 
(unwarranted) assumptions about language.  Firstly, it assumes that the (only) function or 
                                                 
2 As one of us once put it: relativists “are the kind of people who would attribute a geocentric theory of the 
universe to us on the strength of the remark that we intend to get up tomorrow morning to watch the sun 
rise” (Sharrock and Anderson, 1982, p. 111). 
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purpose of language is description.  In other words, it assumes that language is a tool for 
naming the things in the world.  This assumption has an important corollary: if the 
purpose of every language is description, then it is possible to compare whole languages 
of different cultures (as they share the same ‘purpose’ of naming things in the world).   
Secondly, in a typical intellectualist manner, linguistic relativism stipulates that all 
description presupposes an ontological theory or a metaphysics – what Whorf (1956, 
p.221) calls an “unformulated and naive world view” and what Quine (1960, p.22) calls 
“the archaic and unconscious hypothesis of ordinary physical objects”.  In the form that 
we encounter it here this results in the primitive idea that the relationship between 
language and reality is effected by naming, and that the metaphysics of a language is 
manifested in the kinds of things that its names stand for. 
In contrast, we see language as inevitably tied to a people’s culture, i.e., to the world that 
people live in and the practices that they engage in.  Consequently, it is not possible to 
compare languages per se but only aspects of languages. When looking at the empirical 
examples offered by relativism, we find that the linguist either compares things that are 
ostensibly not the same (e.g., science and witchcraft)3 or that the compared things do not 
seem to be significantly different after all (without stipulating a metaphysics).  
                                                 
3 This was already observed by Graves (1960) in his critique of an early form of linguistic relativism 
expressed by Lee (1960): “When discussing differences between the sound-complexes applied in various 
countries to the same reality, one should first make sure that it is the same reality.  The words Brot, pain, 
and Pan are given only one meaning in an English polyglot dictionary: namely, ‘bread’.  But heavy 
German Brot, and light French pain, and hard Spanish pan are not all the same reality.” (p.155) 
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In this article, we will try to exhibit that linguistic relativism is not an empirical but a 
philosophical project – and that it is possible to give an account of the examples offered 
by relativists without making the assumption that the relativist makes. We will focus on 
one central case of linguistic-cum-mathematical relativism, namely Helen Watson’s4 
initial attempts (e.g., Watson, 1987, 1990; Verran, 200a,b) to contrast Yoruba and 
English numbering. However, Watson is just one of many examples in the social studies 
of science literature that are based on the idea that language is description and that 
language embodies a theory of some kind (e.g., Bloor, 1976)5.   
Simplifying in order to create stark binaries 
Watson aims to exposit the different kinds of things encoded in the grammar of English 
and Yoruba.  Her starting point is the assertion that 
[…] predication leads language users to refer in particular ways and 
thus determines what kinds of objects their language defines as 
constituting the universe. I show that English and Yoruba (a West 
African language) predicate in different ways, and consequently 
postulate different kinds of objects. (Watson, 1990, p. 283) 
Note that Watson is talking here about the whole of a language and not some specific 
aspects, e.g., names of snow, cooking utensils, or wedding ceremonies.  Furthermore, 
Watson is comparing exactly two languages, English and Yoruba (rather than eight 
                                                 
4 Helen Watson is now Helen Verran. We will throughout refer to her as ‘Watson’, citing, where necessary, 
her later papers as ‘Verran’. 
5 It is also reflected in the deep rooted and general sociological suspicion of ‘ordinary language’ and in 
much of the long tradition of ideology critique.  Many of the tendencies are crystallised in contemporary 
‘critical discourse analysis’.  In these approaches ‘ordinary language’ is seen as embodying a theory, but an 
at best naïve, or, most often, a wrong one. The relativists share the assumption about the theory-dependence 
of language but are apt to think that all the theories are ‘right’. 
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languages, which might imply that she would have to specify how the languages are 
different and similar).  Watson thus employs a typical relativistic strategy which we 
might call ‘simplifying in order to create stark binaries’. Through creating gross synoptic 
characterisations of aspects of exactly two different languages, it is possible for Watson 
to make a simple and stark contrast. For example, she claims that: 
Talking about the world necessarily involves postulating the type of 
constituents of the material world.  (p. 288) 
This stipulation is not taken as a starting point for a methodic exploration of how many 
different ‘types of constituents’ each language (English and Yoruba) postulates (perhaps 
three, five, or eighty-seven). No, it is further stipulated that each language will (with 
respect to numbers) postulate exactly one type of constituent. In other words, by limiting 
the possible choice of types of things to exactly one per language, Watson can reduce 
variations and align them along a single axis.  This allows her to portray the two 
languages as standing in a simple contrast with respect to the types of things they 
postulate: 
The difference in meaning […] is a difference in the type of material 
object which is being postulated through use of a referring category. (p. 
289; emphases added) 
By reducing the differences between languages to one variable, all other differences are 
obscured.  It is this simplification that enables the transition from a very few examined 
instances to an account of reference for a whole language that leads relativists as Watson 
to think that encountered differences have to be consistently contrasting ontological ones.  
If the analyst took greater care to look at the similarities and differences between 
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languages, as well as the different kinds of differences within and between languages, the 
relativistic project would be much harder to get started.   
The ontological theory ‘encoded’ in language 
Linguistic relativism proceeds by stipulating a separation between words and concepts 
associated with words. The latter is supposed to refer to our ideas or theories about what 
makes the thing designated by the word what it is. For example, Watson (1990, p. 283) 
asserts that “how we count depends on how we conceive objects to exist”. In other words, 
she assumes that our capacity to learn and use language requires possession of an 
additional theory of the world, namely a theory that specifies what it kinds of things our 
words – and numbers – refer to.   
How can the analyst identify this underlying theory? For the relativist the answer lies in 
grammar. It is a further fundamental assumption of linguistic relativism that the grammar 
of a language reflects the form of the underlying concepts of a language. Hence a 
characterisation of the grammatical forms of a language should allow the anthropologist 
to make inferences about the concepts that language-users have of their world: 
Whorf, like many philosophers, has the idea that one can read off a 
metaphysics from the grammar of a language and thereby discern 
something about the thinking of those who speak the language. (Cook, 
1978b, p.7) 
Whorf thinks of a metaphysics as something that is contained in a 
language as an inevitable feature of its grammatical structure. [...] he 
believes that grammatical categories lend themselves to a semantic 
interpretation employing metaphysical terms, such as thing, event, 
process, relation, past, present, future, and so on, so that to speak in a 
certain language just is to operate with, to think with, certain 
metaphysical categories. (Cook, 1978a, p.12) 
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Just as we are not denying that there are differences between languages, so we are not 
denying that people have concepts and that these concepts may differ between different 
cultures (and differ in different ways). However, following Cook’s (1978a,b) critique of 
Whorfian relativism, we challenge the idea of language as a conceptual scheme, i.e., the 
view that language embodies theories of reality.  We are not denying that we have 
concepts, but we are claiming that these concepts arise within language and do not 
underpin it6. 
For the relativist, the Whorfian assumption that the grammar of a language embodies 
metaphysics is the bridge from language to language users. In other words, it is the link 
from linguistics to psychology, sociology, and philosophy – from the structure of 
language to the ways in which people think (especially the way they think of reality). 
Anthropologists such as Watson are not interested in only exhibiting certain grammatical 
differences between languages (say, between the form and placement of otherwise 
equivalent number-words in sentences), but want to demonstrate that what these numbers 
mean (i.e., what species of material entity they are referring to) for language users is 
different. 
                                                 
6 Neither are we denying that words have origins (etymology).  However, we are questioning the role of 
that origin in current language-use.  As Lenneberg (1953, pp. 465-466) observes: “There is a metaphorical 
element in language per se.  The literal meaning of many metaphors, especially the most frequent ones, 
never penetrates consciousness, e.g., everybody, in the face of, beforehand, breakfast, inside, already.  The 
translation method, however, distorts the significance of such forms of speech and often induces 
investigators to draw rather ludicrous conclusions.” In short, the meaning of a word is fixed by its current 
use, not its origin. 
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For the relativist, in order to be able to speak ‘about’ the world one has to be able to 
classify over the things ‘in’ the world. This in turn requires the possession of a theory ‘of’ 
the world (which specifies the criteria for the demarcation of the categories): 
Learning to mean with language starts with classifying, but classifying 
does not amount to making meaningful sentences. Meaningful 
sentences are uttered within the framework of a particular theory of the 
world, a theory which the language used in making meaning necessarily 
and inevitably encodes. (Watson, 1990, p. 287) 
In other words, for Watson it is necessary to have a theory of the world as a precondition 
of being able to acquire the language.  This theory is encoded in the (grammar of the) 
language.  Furthermore, this theory has the form of a proto-language: 
Predication develops from the more complex of the classifying 
activities in what we might call ‘proto-language use’ – classifying over 
actions of bodies. (p. 287) 
Thus, for the relativist, in learning language the child is moving from learning to classify 
things to learning to make meaningful statements. The child therefore must have made  
a leap from proto-language to language; from making classifications to 
making meaningful sentences. A theory of the world has necessarily 
been engaged through adopting a particular way of classifying over 
actions of bodies in coming to use verbs, and the sorts of things that 
constitute the world are inevitably postulated.  A specific sort of 
referring or designating category has been adopted.  This particular type 
of referring category becomes an obligatory assumption of all those 
who use the language. (p. 287) 
According to this picture, someone using language to talk about the world has to 
(implicitly) accept the classificatory assumptions encoded in the language7.  In turn, the 
                                                 
7 Of course this account begs the question of how someone is able to acquire the classifications without 
being able to speak.  In other words: by explaining the acquisition of language through the possession of a 
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analyst can work in the opposite direction, i.e., by investigating grammar the analyst can 
identify the theory embodied in the language: 
We can identify and articulate what sort of a category it is by working 
from our understanding of the rules we use in using verbs – the criteria 
of our classification over actions of bodies, from which verbs grew. (p. 
287) 
In sum, this kind of linguistic relativism concerns divergences between languages that  
are not the usual readily recognised cultural differences, but instead are based on 
(radically) discrepant worldviews that are ‘encoded’ in the respective language.  
Schematically the logic of linguistic relativism can thus be summarised as: 
 a theory of the constituents of the world underlies language;  
 this theory is reflected in grammar;  
 different languages have different grammars; 
 therefore different peoples have different worldviews (where these worldviews 
are not expressed by what individual speakers say, but are built into the structure 
of the language in which they say whatever they say). 
Talking ‘about’ and ‘in’ the world 
Watson’s unquestioning adoption of Whorfian assumptions seems to be reflected in her 
view of the role or status of language, namely that the fundamental function of language 
                                                                                                                                                 
proto-language, the relativist leaves open how we are able to learn the proto-language in the first place.  We 
will take this up in the conclusion. 
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is description. In other words, language is seen as allowing people to talk ‘about’ the 
world.  This is expressed in the title of a section of Watson’s article: 
Talking About the World in English and in Yoruba 
In this section of the paper, I compare the types of material objects 
postulated as constituents of the material world by English-speakers 
and Yoruba-speakers as they engage in ordinary talk of the world. 
(Watson, 1990, p.288) 
By conceiving of the purpose of language as descriptive, Watson is following Whorf, 
who argues that: 
the Hopi language is capable of accounting for and describing 
correctly, in a pragmatic or operational sense, all observable 
phenomena of the universe (Whorf, 1956, p.58; our emphases). 
In contrast, we would argue that ordinary people very rarely talk ‘about’ the world (but 
sociologists and philosophers often do). The affairs of people acting within practices 
would be better characterised as talking ‘in’ the world. It is an intellectualist fallacy to 
suppose that language was ‘invented’ in order to talk about the world – rather than as part 
of various cultural practices. 
Watson seems to be an example of Quine’s (1960, pp. 28-30) ideal linguist in a foreign 
country, who is modelled after an (ideal type) natural scientist, i.e., as a disengaged 
observer. According to Quine’s picture, this linguist adopts an objective or birds-eye 
perspective of the unknown culture and is then faced with the ‘problem’ of inferring from 
people’s verbal behaviour what their sounds mean.  Note that in this picture, there is no 
place for what people actually do, e.g., whether they engage in practices that familiar or 
unfamiliar to the observer.  No one is eating, drawing, or raising rabbits – all they do is 
talk ‘about’ the world. 
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Watson seems to suggest that people are already thinking about the world even prior to 
expressing their thoughts in language. It seems that we discretely first learn words and 
then learn how to apply them: 
An English speaking child learns to chant ‘one, two, three…’, and a 
Yoruba speaking child learns ‘eni, eji, eta’.  Gradually the songs of 
number names become meaningful tools for manipulating the material 
world.  What are the meanings that these words take on as they cease to 
be a mere chant? (Watson, 1987, p.339) 
Number, according to Wittgenstein comes not from the world, but from 
our talk of the world. (Watson, 1987, p.351)8 
In other words, this picture of language is associated with a peculiar picture of language 
learning. It is as though when being taught the words children had to perform an 
additional (cognitive) task which is to figure out what sorts of things those words could 
be talking about. According to this picture, learning the words comes first, followed by 
learning to apply them. However, this picture of language, involving an understanding of 
meaning as a matter of associating words with the things they stand for, is exactly the 
picture of language that Wittgenstein (often cited by relativists) argued against. It 
suggests that there is a level of thoughts (or meanings), either on the individual or the 
society level, prior to language.  Language, on this account, is a way of expressing these 
thoughts (or to communicate them).  
In contrast, we would argue that concepts are acquired from language. In other words, 
thoughts and language co-evolve (without being able to talk it makes no sense to speak of 
                                                 
8 Bloor (1976, p.139) expresses a similar view: “A young child is taught the word ‘hat’ and has learned to 
recognize some hats.” 
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thoughts). Furthermore, language is tied to a culture’s activities. Language co-evolves 
with activities and it is only in those activities that language-use possesses its sense.  
Language is not a way to talk ‘about’ the world, but to carry out activities. In other 
words, the ‘purpose’ of language is not description but is tied to other cultural activities.  
Consequently, naming things in the world is not the purpose of language but only, so to 
speak, a preparation: 
One thinks that learning language consists in giving names to objects. 
Viz, to human beings, to shapes, to colours, to pains, to moods, to 
numbers, etc. . To repeat – naming is something like attaching a label to 
a thing.  One can say that this is preparatory to the use of a word. But 
what is it a preparation for? (Wittgenstein, 1953, §26) 
Naming is so far not a move in the language-game – any more than 
putting a piece in its place on the board is a move in chess.  We may 
say: nothing has so far been done, when a thing has been named. (§49) 
In sum, speaking is tied to doing. In Wittgenstein’s words: “the speaking of language is 
part of an activity, or of a form of life” (§23).  
As outlined above, by stipulating that the purpose of language is description, the relativist 
is enabled to compare languages wholesale.  However, if we see language not as 
independent of a culture and of the assorted practices it accommodates, then it is more 
difficult to compare languages without reference to one or other of the ‘language games’ 
that are played – and the differences that do exist may turn out to require complex, not 
sweeping, comparisons. 
From numbers to number names 
The assumption that the only purpose of language is description can be illustrated by 
anthropological studies of numbers, which focus not on how numbers are used as part of 
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various practices (e.g., selling goods) and whether this use is different in the respective 
cultures, but that instead investigate how number names are linguistically formed. In this 
context, number names are the words that are used to pronounce the numbers when these 
are spoken – e.g. in English, ‘one’, ‘two’, ‘three’, and so on. 
Whilst relativists claim that what numbers ‘are’ may be different in different cultures, 
they typically do not claim that there are any significant computational incompatibilities 
in the practical affairs of everyday lives (e.g., within the trade between two different 
cultures).  For relativists such as Watson (but also, Reed and Lave, 1979), although the 
applications of numbers in respect of, inter alia, measuring quantities and determining 
price are equivalent, there is nonetheless a supposedly significant difference between 
what, for example, English and Yoruba numbers refer to. As these differences will not 
show up in the practical affairs of everyday life, the only place where they are visible is 
in the structure of the language, in particular its grammar:  
The number system can thus be shown to be intimately related to the 
conceptual frame that the linguistic structure lays down. (Watson, 1990, 
p.283) 
The relativist moves from numbers as part of various practices of computation to number 
names as grammatical forms (since these possess linguistic structure and thus can be 
contrasted).  In other words, accepting Whorfist suppositions about the relation of 
grammar to ontological-intellectualist worldviews on the part of actors, the relativist is 
able to make a subtle but vital shift from talking about ‘numbers’ to talking about 
‘number names’.  Thus the question “how Yoruba and English numbers are different” 
(Verran, 2000b, p.346) is supposed to be answered by talking about “number names” (p. 
346) and “number name formation” (p.350).  This is done by ‘translating’ from the 
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indigenous language not into English, but into the (neutral?) Arabic numeric system (on 
the right hand side in the following two tables): 
Vai    Gloss 
lundo    1 
soolu    5 
soolundo   5 + 1 
tan    10 
tansolundo   10 + 5 + 1 
(excerpt from Reed and Lave, 1977, Table 2, p.573) 
 
1  kan    1 
2  méji    2 
10  méwa    10 
11  mókònlaa   (+ 1 + 10) 
15  méèédoguin   (- 5 + 20) 
20  ogun    (20) 
(excerpt from Verran, 2000b, Table 1, p.347) 
 
The move from numbers to number names in both Reed and Lave (1979) and Watson 
enables the Whorfian assumption that language embodies a theory of the constituents of 
the world to enter into the portrayal of the examples. The difference is not to be sought in 
the use of numbers in everyday activities, but in the associated concepts on the parts of 
language users. The concentration seems to be on what speakers mean, treated as 
something independent of how they act. In other words, the move from numbers to 
number names exhibits the Whorfian assumption that language is description: 
A category such as number (singular vs. plural) is an attempted 
interpretation of a whole large order of experience, virtually of the 
world or of nature; it attempts to say how experience is to be 
segmented, what experience is to be called ‘one’ and what ‘several’. 
(Whorf, 1956, p.137) 
Page 17 of 50 
Greiffenhagen, C. and W. Sharrock (2007). Linguistic relativism: logic, grammar, and arithmetic in cultural 
comparison. Language & Communication 27 (1), 81-107.  
 
Number names seem to be treated by relativists as if their linguistic form displays 
cognitive processes involved in their use.  It is suggested that when the Yoruba say 
“fifteen” they think ‘take five from twenty’, whilst we think ‘ten plus five’ or ‘add five to 
ten’. It is as if an English speaker saying ‘eleven’ is really saying ‘ten plus one’ and must 
(mentally) make that computation whenever he or she says ‘eleven’.  This raises the root 
question: How far can one treat formal structural properties of a language system as 
entering into the sense of what its users say and mean? 
The relativist assumes, firstly, that being able to count presupposes a metaphysical 
conception of the constituents of nature (being able to identify the items that are to be 
enumerated), and, secondly, that these concepts are captured in the grammar of number 
names (i.e., in their linguistic form). Again, it is simply stipulated that these translations 
capture how the people in a culture calculate.  For example, Reed and Lave (1979, p.574) 
write: 
when we add 17 and 3, we have a single ‘carry the 1’ to do; Vai and 
Gola have two analogous steps to perform: (10 + 5 + 2) + (3) = 10 + 5 + 
5 = 10 + 10 = 20.  
But surely people competent in basic arithmetic (in either language/culture) can add 17 to 
3 without any operations (seventeen and three is twenty).  However, within the relativist’s 
framework, any application of number is organised through some mental-conceptual 
operations on the part of actors.  Again: How do relativists know which mental operations 
are being performed – except by hypothesising them from, and reading them back into, 
the differences of linguistic form? 
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Let us again look at an example closer to home, e.g., English and French numbers (or 
number names).  In French, 80 is ‘quatre-vingts’ (“4x20”) and 90 ‘quatre-vingt-dix’ 
(“4x20+10”).  Following the relativists’ argument, we must conjure cognitive operations 
out of the forms of these number words.  In that case, when the French say ‘quatre-vingt-
dix’ they must accompany this by mentally adding ten to four times twenty.  Again, that 
different languages have different names for their numbers comes as no great surprise.  
However, do these different names imply that different cultures calculate differently or 
that their practical calculations are accompanied by a necessarily distinctive sequence of 
computations? Do the French have distinctive computations or more problems in adding 
82 + 82 than the English? Do they even go through different computations than the 
English?   
From number names to theories of number 
As we have already shown with the example of the transition from numbers to number 
names, it is crucial to Watson’s argument to fuse number systems with the ontology 
embodied in the language. Watson makes another attempt to connect Yoruba ontology 
into its numbering system by drawing on (meta-) mathematical formalisations of number 
systems. Watson is interested in these metamathematical formalisations of number 
systems, since one might be more akin to the English or Yoruba ontology encoded in 
language. Her treatment of this issue reinforces our point about the descriptive limbo in 
which her renderings exist, neither describing the operational procedures of a 
grammatical or mathematical system nor the actual practice of computations.   
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Watson compares von Neumann’s set-theoretic formalisation of the number system with 
Zermelo’s, and announces that 
As an English-language user of number, von Neuman’s [sic] account 
seems to me to be intuitively correct. […] In contrast, I suggest that a 
Yoruba speaker would choose Zermelo’s account of number as correct. 
(Watson, 1990, p. 307) 
Note again the strategy of ‘simplifying in order to create stark binaries’: on Watson’s 
account there are exactly two possible ways to formalise numbers.  This allows Watson 
to ‘discover’ that one fits the English and the other the Yoruba conception of number. 
However, and more importantly: Are we here dealing with a preference that any actual 
Yoruba speaker has ever had? Or are we dealing with a preference that Watson ‘reads 
into’ ordinary practices (cf., Macbeth, 2002)?    
The claim that any other English speaker would concur with her intuition and prefer von 
Neumann’s account is easily disputed, since many English speakers would see no prima 
facie reason to prefer either one or the other formation as ‘intuitively correct’. In our 
view, no English speaker need think that either account “would ‘jump out’ as the 
intuitively correct account” (p.308) – at least not without prior briefing in what is 
involved in philosophical-mathematical arguments. We would argue, rather, that neither 
von Neumann’s nor Zermelo’s account is distinctively ‘correct’, as both are ‘correct’ in 
terms of the standards that can be used to assess the adequacy of a formalisation as a 
representation of that which it formalises.  Watson here engages in what we call the 
Page 20 of 50 
Greiffenhagen, C. and W. Sharrock (2007). Linguistic relativism: logic, grammar, and arithmetic in cultural 
comparison. Language & Communication 27 (1), 81-107.  
 
‘ontologising of mundane phenomena’9. Mathematically speaking, the number sequence 
which the von Neumann and Zermelo schemes respectively formalise is, of course, one 
and the same (it is the sequence of the natural numbers: 1, 2, 3, and so on)10. Further, 
each of these two formalisations is capable of reproducing the form of succession of that 
sequence expressed in terms of relations between sets (but applying set theory in two 
different ways). There is therefore no mathematical  reason why either of these should be 
judged to better present the number sequence to English speakers, nor to suppose that 
only one of them could be correct (why suppose that there must be only one way, or 
exactly two ways, in which to formalise the natural numbers?).  
Thus, there can be no question as to whether either scheme could give the impression of 
representing the English number system in a better or worse way. Questions about which 
one is preferable are inevitably technical mathematical-philosophical ones, of which the 
average English or Yoruba speaker will be wholly unaware, and which could make no 
difference to their calculating practices were they to be advised of them. To see what the 
disagreement over the two formalisations might involve (which is at no point a 
                                                 
9 In a later paper (Verran, 2000b, p.364) she seems to acknowledge this: “For years as I puzzled about the 
differences between Yoruba and English numbers, I remained convinced that I had accidentally stumbled 
across all the signs of the existence of the object – Yoruba numeration.  I failed to notice that if I had just 
used numbers, say in buying provisions for my family in the market, concentrating only on the price of the 
bowl of rice (insisting loudly that the vendor heap it up) or pile of tomatoes (noting in my negotiations their 
over-ripeness), bargaining with the vendor to get a better price, there would have be no resources to make 
an object with.  It is precisely that I am bringing the object of the Yoruba numeration system home to the 
academy rather than just the rice and tomatoes home to my family, which provides the materials to generate 
the object ‘Yoruba numeration system’.”  
10 Even Quine recognises this: “One uses Frege’s version or von Neumann’s or yet another, such as 
Zermelo’s, opportunistically to suit the job at hand, if the job is one that calls for providing a version of 
number at all. […] Each of these three progressions or any other will do the work of natural numbers, and 
each happens to be geared also further jobs to which the others are not.” (Quine, 1960, p.263) 
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mathematical disagreement) one would need to acquaint oneself with philosophical-
mathematical conceptions about what is at stake in the attempt to give satisfactory 
formalisation of the nature of number. In other words, one would engage with the 
philosophical-mathematical foundations of number and debates among, inter alia, Frege, 
Boole, Russell, Hilbert, Wittgenstein, Brouwer, and so on. However, the different 
philosophical positions do not align with grammatical, cultural, or psychological 
differentiation of English or Yoruba. 
Watson (1990) says about English: 
As an English-language user of number, von Neuman’s [sic] account 
seems to me intuitively correct [about English number words]. 
Cardinality, on his account, seems to encode a one-by-one collection of 
predecessors […] A number, in this version, is the last number of the 
series reached through one-by-one progression. (p. 307) 
In contrast,  
[…] a Yoruba speaker would choose Zermelo’s account of number as 
correct. […] In this version, each number is totally subsumed by its 
successor, and any one number has a unified nature. I contend that for a 
Yoruba speaker, the model of the number which would ‘jump out’ as 
the intuitively correct account would be this one, for Yoruba-language 
numbers carry ‘the flavour’ of a divided whole; there is no sense of a 
linear stretching towards the infinite here. (pp. 307-308) 
Whilst these picturesque characterisations may have illustrated the sense in which 
Watson reads Zermelo’s account of set-theory as corresponding to her picture of Yoruba 
and English ontologies, she does nothing to demonstrate that the construction, 
understanding, or use of that formalisation plays a role on the part of actors. In other 
words, we would like to see an explanation of how the imagined ontological content 
might be shown to be integral to the mathematical constructions themselves.  We would 
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like to see a demonstration of how it is that, in mathematically relevant ways, Zermelo’s 
formalisation categorically lacks what von Neumann’s allegedly possesses, namely “a 
sense of a linear stretching towards the infinite”. We would also welcome a detailing of 
how “‘the flavour’ of a divided whole” is to be found in one but not in the other. We do 
not say that such an account could not be persuasively given, but that its persuasiveness 
would scarcely hinge upon the instantly intuitive transparency of the initial 
characterisation. 
What is notably absent from Watson’s (as well as Reed and Lave’s) accounts of numbers 
is any use of numbers in daily life, i.e., a demonstration that in their daily lives the 
Yoruba count differently from us. The comments that the authors do make show 
consistently the contrary, namely that the mathematical operations remain the same.  For 
example: 
Among other things, Yoruba-speaking people buy and sell oranges, 
rope and beverages, plots of land and nuggets of gold.  The actions they 
use in these exchange transactions are familiar and recognizable to 
English speakers who, by watching, can easily render in English-
language terms what has been bought and sold […]. (Watson, 1990, 
p.294; emphasis added) 
And: 
The English-speaking visitor to Yorubaland, and the Yoruba-speaking 
visitor to England, feel a comforting familiarity while watching the 
foreigners ascribing value during the exchange of goods.  Their actions 
show that they are using the familiar ways of perceiving ‘the amount of 
stuff here and now’. Although the talk of foreigners cannot be 
understood, and the ways percepts are talked of and the things they are 
said to be are unknown, a stranger may still successfully participate in 
the exchange. (Watson, 1990, p.292; emphasis added) 
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In other words, the supposed differences in ontologies are not the kinds of differences 
that show up the practical affairs of everyday life. Despite the supposedly significant 
differences between English and Yoruba, it is possible to trade between the two countries 
without  misunderstandings – and it is possible for an English person to visit the Yoruba 
and make sense of what they do (while allegedly not really understanding what they say). 
Different ontologies: spatiotemporal and sortal particulars 
After this illustration of Watson’s rationale for moving from ordinary words and ordinary 
practices to ontological schemes (or Weltanschauungen) we will now try to outline what 
we understand the respective ontologies to be, since these are not spelled out in any 
coherent way (nor is there much attempt to show how this supposed difference cashes 
out).  
Watson aims to surprise her readers by showing that the difference between these two 
languages is other than they had supposed it.  Rather than showing that these two 
languages speak of the same things in different ways, Watson wants to show that these 
two languages speak of different things: 
Analysing the workings of predicators in English-language usage and in 
Yoruba language-usage to infer the extension of designating terms used 
in utterances in those languages, leads me to a conclusion that some 
may find rather startling: namely, that speakers of these languages talk 
of different types of things when they designate over the material 
world. (p. 289; emphasis added) 
Of course everything hinges on how ‘speaking of things’ is to be understood.   We do not 
find it easy to fix on just how English and Yoruba are supposed to differ and our attempt 
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to do this immediately follows accompanied by some comments on the difficulties we 
have. 
Recall that Watson’s eventual target is the referential status of numbers. Furthermore, 
recall that Watson does not aim to show that Yoruba and English mathematics are 
different in the sense that they generate different results (i.e., five plus seven gives twelve 
in English and Yoruba mathematics). Instead, Watson wants to prove that what the 
numbers ‘are’ (what they signify) in Yoruba is different from what they refer to when we 
use them.  In other words, in both English and Yoruba 5 – 3 = 2 but the kind of 
fundamental entity the ‘2’ refers to differs in each case. Hence, Watson is not concerned 
with practical language use or application of mathematics in everyday computation. 
Instead, she postulates a difference in the way objects are classified (though that 
difference does not entail divergence in the criteria of individuation for everyday 
objects): 
I have proposed that referring develops from the practice of juxtaposing 
two types of classifiers – classifiers over types of bodies, and classifiers 
of the types of action that bodies engage in. The type of classification 
wrought with respect to interaction between bodies will determine the 
type that the referring category is. In English we have verbs, which 
code the interaction between bodies on the basis of spatially 
individuated bodies taken to endure across time, as the interacting 
element. The referring category created by the functioning of verbs in 
the code which is the English language is the category of 
spatiotemporal particulars. 
In the Yoruba language, interaction between bodies is coded as one 
type of matter interacting with other types of matter; the interacting 
element is treated as a particular sort of matter. This type of referring 
category implicit [emphasis added] in Yoruba-language use is the 
category of sortal particular (Watson, 1990, p. 289). 
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We find it difficult to determine what Watson is claiming here: Is she remarking on the 
linguistic structure of these two languages? Is she making some (strange) metaphysical 
stipulations about language? Is she talking about aspects of the Yoruba language or 
culture that might be unfamiliar to the English? Firstly, note again the use of the strategy 
‘simplifying in order to create stark binaries’, i.e., the availability of precisely two types 
of classifiers – which then allows Watson to map exactly one classifier onto each 
language (just imagine the complications for her argument if there were three, or even 
five, types of classifiers). Secondly, note the movement between grammar and ontology, 
i.e., between talking about verbs and talking about “spatially individuated bodies taken to 
endure across time”.  It is on the latter level that Watson wants to discover differences: 
Because of the different classifications which lie behind the functioning 
of ‘is’ and ‘jé’ as predicators, an English speaker ends up referring to a 
spatially separated and temporally located material object, and a 
Yoruba speaker ends up referring to a section of matter that is created 
around a certain set of characteristics – matter of a certain sort. (p. 289) 
Watson’s ‘startling’ conclusion: the English and Yoruba talk about different kinds of 
things.  We would like to get a clearer idea of what the difference in kind is supposed to 
be. Here is Watson on English: 
The material objects which English-speakers talk of are 
spatiotemporally defined objects of different sorts.  For English 
speakers, the primary criterion by which the objects talked of are 
defined is the idea of matter set in relation to the idea of space-time.  
Secondarily, these objects are categorized along sortal lines.  Features 
that spatiotemporal things are said to have name the different inherent 
characteristics which things of different sorts are supposed to have.  
English-speaking people come to say that the spatiotemporal particulars 
that they talk of have ‘qualities’.  Qualities do not purport to name 
material objects.  Toes cannot be kicked against qualities, nor fingers 
dipped into them. 
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The idea of amount of matter enters English-language talk through talk 
of qualities.  The extent to which some qualities are held or exhibited 
by spatiotemporal particulars may be taken as varying concomitantly 
with the total amount of matter which constitutes that spatiotemporal 
particular.  These qualities are those which are most commonly 
exhibited: numerosity, volume, area, length and weight. In ordinary 
English-language quantification, the extent to which any of these 
qualities is exhibited by a spatiotemporal particular, may be reported 
with a number.  That number is taken as reporting ‘the total amount of 
matter manifesting’. (p. 293) 
To the best of our understanding, Watson is trying to exhibit the structure of the 
metaphysics embodied in the English language.  According to her, the basic ‘building 
blocks’ are spatiotemporal particulars. These spatiotemporal particulars have qualities 
that are not themselves spatiotemporal particulars.   English-speaking is apparently seen 
to involve referring to (so to speak) individually independent entities.  These entities are 
supposed to be items that are discrete from all others and whose identity is exhausted by 
their existence at a particular time and a determinable place. 
It seems that Watson is talking about a fairly straightforward atomistic ontology here: 
there are things in the world and these things possess definite qualities, such as length and 
weight. What is perhaps a bit surprising is the inclusion of numerosity among the 
qualities: are two pigs ‘one’ thing with the numerosity ‘two’ – or ‘two’ things each with 
the numerosity ‘one’? Further, note the way that identification involves primary and 
secondary identifications. We wonder how such a treatment of English might apply to 
‘paper cup’, ‘rubber ball’ or ‘toughened glass’.  Finally, it seems that a sophisticated 
theory of the world is needed in order to be able (say, for a child) to speak about pigs and 
horses. 
In turn, the ontology embodied in the Yoruba language is described as follows: 
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The object which Yoruba speakers are committed to saying there are in 
the world are sortal particulars – material objects defined through their 
particular nature.   Certain sets of characteristics form definitive 
boundaries of the material objects that Yoruba speakers talk of; the 
objects talked of are construed as being infinitely scattered through 
space and time.  The here/now-ness or then/there-ness of a 
manifestation is irrelevant in creating an object to talk of. We could say 
that qualities are the boundary lines of the objects primarily talked of by 
Yoruba speakers.  Sortal particulars cannot be ascribed qualities, since 
it is on the basis of a qualitative distinction that they come into being as 
objects to talk of. 
When one speaks of sortal particulars, and one wants to say more about 
them than merely that they manifest in their characteristic ways, it is on 
their mode of manifesting that one must comment.  Mode is the manner 
in which a sortal particular manifests – a here/now or then/there 
(spatiotemporal) slice of a sortal particular.  When sortal particulars are 
the primary material objects that one speaks of, the modes in which 
they may be said to manifest are features of these objects. In 
quantification in Yoruba-language talk, it is through mode that number 
comes to report the idea of total amount of matter present.  Valuation 
over matter is a form of modification in Yoruba-language talk. (pp. 
297-298) 
Perhaps for Watson this means something like the following: the Yoruba do not have an 
atomistic ontology, but instead have a continuous or flowing one11. In other words, the 
stipulated ‘building blocks’ of the Yoruba ontology are not separate, discrete items – but 
are continuous bodies (blocks?) of ‘matter’.  For the Yoruba, the world supposedly 
consists not of individualised units of the sort that English-speakers identify as objects.  
Instead, the world for the Yoruba is said to consist fundamentally of what English-
speakers might term substances. It is out of these substances that observable things (what, 
                                                 
11 Watson seems to be following Quine’s discussion of (theoretically) possible translations of the imagined 
word ‘gavagai’ (apart from simply as ‘rabbit’): “A further alternative likewise compatible with the same 
old stimulus meaning is to take ‘gavagai’ as a singular term naming the fusion, in Goodman’s sense, of all 
rabbits: that single though discontinuous portion of the spatiotemporal world that consists of rabbits. [...] 
And a still further alternative in the case of ‘gavagai’ is to take it as a singular term naming a recurring 
universal, rabbithood.”  (Quine, 1960, pp.51-52) 
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in English would be identified as objects) are made.  Each fundamental substance appears 
to comprise one single extensive and unified entity, which is continuous and ‘infinitely 
spread’ through space. On this account, observable things are localised materialisations 
(pun intended!) of the continuity of these substances, and are not, therefore, free standing 
and discrete entities.  Observable things then are part of the one (or more?) substance(s) 
of which they partake. Thus, they are not genuine units, but only – Watson’s word – 
‘slices’ or ‘sections’ of the basic substances (note the metaphoric character of ‘slice’ and 
‘section’). 
For Watson, the English-speaking idea of an object seems applicable in Yoruba – if at all 
– only to the fundamental substances (though something which is infinitely spread would 
not easily qualify as a ‘bounded entity’), for observable things retain their connection 
with the substances of which they are part. Thus, what English would designate an object 
is only a localised fragment from the single underlying substance, and is recognised to be 
such by Yoruba-speakers. For Watson, when the Yoruba (seemingly) speak of any 
individual thing, they actually speak of it as a subdivided extract from the unified 
substance. This explains Watson’s rather strange translations, of, e.g., “It is water” as 
“Watermatter (matter with the characteristics of waterness) here 
manifests its inner, intrinsic and permanent nature” (p.289). 
Or “He gave me four stones” as 
“He gave me matter with characteristics of stoneness manifesting 
here/now as a collection divided to the extent of four” (p. 298). 
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Note again the very elaborate ontology necessary on part of language-users – but also the 
possibly problematic relation between what a speaker is saying and what, according to 
Watson, the speaker must be meaning (see below). 
Having postulated two different ontologies, Watson now moves on to numbers: 
Collections of individual things are said to have the quality of 
numerosity to a certain extent.  Cumulations of continuous matter are 
said to have the qualities of length, area, volume or weight to varying 
extents.  When numerosity is used as the basis of quantification, the 
process is called ‘counting’. (p. 294) 
In English-language talk, number is a concept which organizes over the 
concept of qualities, which in turn organizes over the concept of 
spatiotemporal particulars. (p. 300) 
In other words: spatiotemporal particulars are supposed to have qualities (e.g., 
numerosity or length) which can be measured. Thus, numbering in English is (for 
Watson) a matter of serially attaching equally discrete numerals to a plurality of singular 
countable items. In contrast:  
Yoruba speakers talk of a particular sort of continuous matter, an object 
spread infinitely over the here/now—then/there.  In generalizing over 
this category, they come to talk of mode, a ‘slice’ of a sortal object, 
bounded by the here/now or then/there. […] Number, in Yoruba-
language talk, is a degree of dividedness within here/now—then/there 
slices of sortal particulars. In Yoruba-language talk, number organizes 
over mode, which in turn organizes over the sortal particulars. (p. 301) 
For Watson, numbers among the Yoruba-speakers number how many subdivisions have 
been made within a greater whole.  
As far as we can understand what Watson is trying to say here, it seems to boil down to 
something like the following: within the English atomistic ontology the world already 
comes in objects which, inter alia, have the quality of ‘unit’.  Hence, counting means 
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‘collecting’.  In contrast, the Yoruba continuous ontology does not have such discrete 
objects but continuous substances that turn up in bits.  Thus counting for the Yoruba is 
‘subdividing’. 
How is the comparison done? 
Watson’s overall goal is to exhibit differences in the ontologies embodied in the 
respective languages.  It seems to us that there are two possible ways of doing this.  The 
first would involve a neutral or independent standard according to which aspects of both 
languages can be compared.  The second would involve the direct translation from one 
language into the other (without making recourse to an intermediate, independent 
standard). 
(a) Neutral/independent standard 
The first is a familiar way of proceeding in fields such as phonetics or cognitive 
anthropology. This method was implicitly employed, firstly, in the discussion of different 
number names above (where the Arabic numerals constituted an independent standard of 
English and Yoruba number words), and, secondly, in the theories of numbers 
‘embodied’ in the language (where set theory was used to characterise both von 
Neumann versus Zermelo formalisations of the natural numbers).   
If there was an objective language available for describing worldviews or metaphysics, 
then that language could be used to compare instances of concrete realisations, e.g., 
between the English and Yoruba metaphysics.  However, despite attempts by logical 
positivists to develop such a language, it is generally not in any way regarded as standard 
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(and Watson does not seem to employ it in her argument).  Furthermore, such a standard 
would itself not be relative, but absolute (and thereby refute the relativistic thesis). 
Another possible way would be to see grammatical categories as constituting such a 
neutral standard, e.g., ‘verb’ or ‘adjective’ as designating concepts that are language-
independent12.  In that case, Watson could proceed as follows: an ontology of the world is 
needed in order to be able to speak; this ontology is reflected in the grammar of a 
language; linguistics has provided us with a ‘neutral observation language’ to describe 
the grammar of a particular language; given this grammatical description we can then 
‘read off’ the ontology from the grammar. Watson sometimes seems to be proceeding 
along such lines: 
The grammatical mechanism through which the sortal particulars that 
Yoruba speakers talk of are modified in the operation of ascribing value 
involves the incorporation of nominalized verb phrases in an elided 
form. (p. 298) 
However, for us it seems problematic to attempt to extrapolate from grammatical features 
of language to supposed ontological presuppositions of language. Why should familiar 
grammatical differences necessarily project ‘different kinds of objects’? We have in 
mind, for plain example, the differences between English, French, and German and their 
                                                 
12 This again raises the problem that the categories of grammar would then seem to be absolute and not 
relative.  As Joseph (2002, p.104) puts it: “It seems clear enough that Sapir and Whorf share with the 
analytic philosophers and semanticists a fundamental belief in a transcendent, universal logic which no 
‘natural’ language captures perfectly.  Whorf also holds at times that some languages capture some aspects 
of this logic better than others, as when with regard to tense in Hopi he does not describe it as constructing 
time in an alternative and equally valid to that of ‘Standard Average European’, but in a way that would 
make Hopi a superior vehicle for the formulation of quantum physics.  Thus his ‘linguistic relativity 
principle’ fails to be relativistic in two senses, since it is grounded in a belief in ‘true’ logic, and does not 
decline to pass judgement on how well particular languages embody that logic.” 
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number of articles/genders: one (“the”) in English, two (“le, la”) in French, and three 
(“der, die, das”) in German. For certain purposes (e.g., teaching a foreign language) it 
might make sense to translate the French “la pomme” into “she apple” and the German 
“der Apfel” into “he apple” to illustrate the different grammatical forms in the languages.  
However, why would we want to say that this has metaphysical implications? Should the 
latter be really be translated to “here is an apple in all its masculinity” in order to convey 
to English-speakers that in German, apples have male genitals, and French apples have 
female ones? Do English, French, or German people have different experiences when 
actually eating an apple? Do they think about a different kind of object when talking 
about an apple? In which sense could we say that ‘she apple’ or ‘he apple’ means or says 
anything in English that is not perfectly satisfactorily translated by ‘apple’?  In our view, 
neither ‘he apple’ nor ‘she apple’ are good renderings into English, since they do not 
mean anything in that language. What they mean in German and French is fully given by 
translation into English as ‘apple’.  
In our view, it is the words that are gendered not necessarily the things that the words 
may be identifiers for. Knowing the gender of a word provides a rule for grammatical 
formation of constructions using those words (for example, pronouns used, endings 
attached, or matters of complementation). The same point applies to, for example, the 
active and the passive. It would be naïve to think that variations between active and 
passive constructions featuring a verb automatically indicates a difference with respect to 
either what was done or how it was done. Active and passive forms can often both and 
indifferently identify the same action. 
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However, despite occasional references to the grammatical structures of the respective 
languages, Watson typically bypasses grammar and directly attempts to talk about the 
implied ontologies.  Thus, in our view, Watson does not proceed in this first way of 
comparison. Instead, Watson’s arguments are meant to take their strength from the way 
Yoruba expressions translate into English. 
(b) Translation from one language to another 
One might suppose that translation from Yoruba to English would be very difficult since 
according to Watson there is a significant difference in the respective ontologies. It is 
also worth recalling that Watson is not reporting some hitherto unknown tongue with no 
prior English translations, but comparing two languages where translation has been an 
ongoing affair. In fact, dictionaries and introductory textbooks are available (e.g., Barber, 
1984). 
Watson bids to secure the adequacy of the translations as the paper was reviewed by 
competent Yoruba speakers who complimented their quality: 
Translations of Yoruba-language utterances into English are crucial to 
the argument in this paper.  However, only the exceptional reader will 
be in a position to evaluate the translations. A reader might well 
question the veracity of the translations, and hence be quite unmoved 
by the argument. Here readers must rely on the referees of the paper 
who speak Yoruba.  […] Since the rendering of Yoruba language 
utterances into English is crucial, I make several attempts in English to 
catch the subtleties I am trying to focus upon.  The first translation 
conveys most precisely what is encoded in the Yoruba utterance; 
subsequent glosses work towards less clumsy and more acceptable 
English. (Watson, 1990, pp. 310-311, endnote 15; our emphasis). 
At the same time, Watson points out that her English translations differ from those which 
might be conventionally and readily given for Yoruba expressions.  Her translations are 
Page 34 of 50 
Greiffenhagen, C. and W. Sharrock (2007). Linguistic relativism: logic, grammar, and arithmetic in cultural 
comparison. Language & Communication 27 (1), 81-107.  
 
meant to render “what is encoded in the Yoruba utterance” (p.311; our emphasis). She 
describes some of her English representations of Yoruba as “literal translations” (e.g., p. 
289). However, it is not clear to us that this is what they are.   
Watson, again, seems to following in the footsteps of Whorf and Sapir who used the 
method of ‘conceptual translations’: 
Sapir, for instance, says that when a sentence from another language 
has been thus translated into distorted English, it has been ‘conceptually 
translated’.  By this he seems to mean that we can get at the meaning of 
the original sentence by means of the piece of distorted English. [...]  
Why, then, does Sapir call it a translation, and why a conceptual 
translation? It is because he intends that we should read through ‘It 
stones down’ as though we were reading in some language, in order 
that the ‘meanings’ of the grammatical categories of Nootka shall be 
registered in our minds as they are in the minds of the speakers of 
Nootka when they use the (actual) Nootka sentence.  This is why Sapir 
calls it a ‘conceptual translation’: he thinks that it reveals Nootka 
‘concepts’ or ‘meanings’. (Cook, 1978b, p.10) 
Of course, the problem with such ‘conceptual translations’ is to specify the range of 
applicability: does it apply to every feature of grammar (including, for example, gendered 
nouns in German and French)? If not, how can the analyst specify when and why it 
applies? 
Sapir at one point makes a half-hearted qualification of this idea.  
Alluding to the fact that in his conceptual translation he includes even 
such things as gender, he remarks that he has ‘exaggerated somewhat’.  
‘It goes without saying’, he adds, ‘that a Frenchman has no clear sex 
notion in his mind when he speaks of un arbre (‘a-masculine tree’) or 
of une pomme (‘a-feminine apple’).’ [...] – One is led to wonder, of 
course, how Sapir managed to distinguish between what is and what is 
not thus ‘exaggerated’ in his conceptual translations. (Cook, 1978b, 
p.34; endnote 38) 
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We typically would use the term literal translation if we want to indicate that the English 
words that are selected occupy a grammatical category and are arranged in a grammatical 
sequence which is approximately equivalent to the grammatical arrangement of a 
sentence from another language. In other words, the Yoruba language might 
accommodate constructions of a kind that do not correspond in any straightforward one-
to-one fashion to constructions in English. In this way, these ‘literal’ translations may 
perspicuously display some of the differences between the two grammars (construed in 
terms of ordinary linguistic categories such as ‘noun’, ‘adverb’, or ‘verb’).  For example, 
in order to display different locations of the verb in English or German sentences we may 
translate a German utterance not as “I want to know his name”, but ‘literally’ as “I want 
his name know”.  
However, as already pointed out, this kind of grammatical transliteration does not seem 
to be what Watson has in mind. Watson is less interested in comparing different 
grammars as such, than in comparing implicit ontologies and her translations seem to be 
designed to render what Yoruba-speaking says about the nature of the world rather than 
the specific differences in grammatical structures between the two tongues.  Thus, an 
answer to the question “What is it?” in Yoruba that could (and apparently for all practical 
purposes would) be translated into English as “It is water”, is rendered as: 
“Watermatter (matter with the characteristics of waterness) here 
manifests its inner, intrinsic and permanent nature” (p.289). 
Alternatively, “It is a hoe” is rendered as: 
“Hoematter (matter with the characteristics of hoeness) here manifests 
its inner, intrinsic and permanent nature” (p. 289). 
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We remain unclear as to how Watson arrives at these ‘translations’ or ‘renderings’. There 
seem to be two possibilities.  Firstly, the Yoruba are actually voicing just these words.  
On that count, all previous translations from the Yoruba into English (e.g., as simply “It 
is a hoe”) are in a profound sense wrong, and Watson is claiming that she is the first one 
to provide a correct translation. That seems rather odd.   
Alternatively, and secondly, the Yoruba might not be actually saying this, but perhaps 
Watson wants to say that this is what they mean when they say these words – it is 
‘encoded’ in those words.  In that case it seems at least as plausible that it is not the 
Yoruba that mean this – but it is Watson ‘reading into’ ordinary Yoruba discourse her 
own metaphysical assumptions.  In our view, it is Watson who insists that this is what the 
Yoruba must be meaning by what they are saying (even though Yoruba-speakers are not 
themselves aware that they must be meaning this – see below). We are saying this not on 
the basis of our knowledge of the Yoruba language, but on the basis of our knowledge of 
the English language, for which Watson claims the following: 
When one is an English-speaker and fingers are held up in code for 
separated material items, their separateness and spatiotemporal 
uniqueness is inevitably commented upon by English-speakers in 
designating. (p. 305) 
In our view, an English speaker, who is asked “How much water is coming out of that 
tap?” and replies “five gallons a minute”, is not making any additional comment of the 
order “five spatiotemporally segregated, discrete and unique units” (and English speakers 
are presumably well aware that fingers are subdivisions of the hand). Consequently, 
Watson’s translations are not ‘translations’ in the traditional sense but are ‘metaphysical 
renderings’.  Our problem with Watson has less to do with faithfulness to the form of the 
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Yoruba original and more with the English into which the Yoruba is purportedly 
rendered. No matter what the Yoruba original, we cannot see that Watson’s translations 
provide any intelligible rendering of that into English, since there seems to be no 
(distinctive) sense to it. In English, does “water ‘manifests its inner, intrinsic and 
permanent nature’” differ significantly (in meaning or substance) from “there is some 
water”? In English, “its inner, intrinsic and permanent nature” has no genuine semantic 
value – for what might reference to that ‘nature’ possibly be? What, in English, could the 
latter phrase add to “there’s some water”? Does “its inner, intrinsic and permanent 
nature” refer to liquidity, wetness of touch, or colourlessness? However, if so, why call 
these constituents of the ‘inner’ nature of water rather than less portentously rendered as 
standard characteristics of water (the same characteristics for the Yoruba as for us, 
perhaps)?  
Describing the world correctly 
Some of these confusions can be explained through Watson’s peculiar picture of 
language.  Above, we had pointed out that for Watson language is a tool to talk ‘about’ 
the world.  In other words, for Watson, the primary function of words is to identify 
things. However, taking her intellectualist-metaphysical project one step further, Watson 
seems to assume that in talking about the world ordinary people are also expressing their 
preconception of what kinds of things the world is made of.  We are saying this, because 
according to Watson language is not just used in order to talk ‘about’ the world, but its 
use presupposes the speakers’ conviction that they to do so in a ‘correct’ way: 
An English-speaking person might use natural number in quantification 
and say ‘four oranges are there in the bowl’, or ‘I would like one 
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kilogram of oranges, please’, and she would feel confident that she is 
talking about what there is in the world, in a precisely correct way.  
[…] When you talk in English, there is a right and a wrong way to talk 
of things and their qualities, and use numerals in that talk.  There is a 
right and a wrong way, not because the world is organized in a 
particular way, but because English-speaking people engage in 
particular organizing practices and say it is organized in that way. 
(Watson, 1990, pp. 300-301; our emphases)13 
What is Watson saying here? Is she pointing to the fact that the English speaker is 
confident that there are four (and not three or five) oranges? Or that the English speaker 
apart from saying ‘how many’ oranges there are, has also made a statement about 
oranges (e.g., that they are ‘spatio-temporal particulars’)? Has the English speaker also 
said something about the nature of oranges (e.g., that they possess the quality 
numerosity)?  
We think that the contrast of ‘the world being organised in a particular way’ and ‘saying 
it is organised that way’ is a completely false, wholly contrived, contrast. Of course it is 
wholly correct to say that there are ten dogs here, because these are dogs and we have 
correctly enumerated them according to the rules of the natural numbers. However, on 
what basis could speakers of a language assure themselves that their language speaks of 
the world in ‘precisely the correct’ way? How could we (or the Yoruba) tell that our 
tongue (and its implied ontology) successfully captures the structure of the world? What 
criteria could be applied to show than the way in which one language identifies basic 
constituents is evidently preferable to the other?  In other words, what could possibly go 
                                                 
13 See also the quotation by Whorf on page 12 above. 
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to show that the world really is made up of sortal particulars as opposed to 
spatiotemporal ones? 
These questions are, of course, meaningless.  Neither language is true or false.  Our 
confidence in the correctness of what we say in the language derives not from an 
understanding of the way in which the language divides up the world but from our 
capacity to speak the language. An English speaker can perhaps be confident that he is 
talking about the world in a precisely correct way when, like Wittgenstein, they respond 
to the question “How do you know that is red?” with “I have learned English”.  Learning 
the word ‘red’ in English involves – amongst many other things – being able correctly to 
identify samples of red (that colour is called ‘red’).  More fully, it is called red in English.  
It is called ‘rouge’ in French.  Perhaps some languages do not have any name for ‘red’, or 
perhaps the name they have does not entirely coincide in the way ‘red’ is distinguished 
from other colours. Again, the truly surprising thing would be a people who apparently 
lacked colour vision, who made no colour discriminations, or had nothing that could be 
called a colour vocabulary – not ones whose colour vocabulary can be co-ordinated with 
ours.   
In what sense could someone who speaks of colours in English go wrong merely by 
virtue of their use of the colour vocabulary, and in what corresponding way could the 
user of another colour vocabulary go right (except in respect of the application of the 
colour vocabulary being used)?   There is no place in the discourse for the assertion that 
this colour ‘really is red’ rather than ‘rouge’. After all, does it even make sense to say that 
this really is red rather than maroon, or really red rather than scarlet? That distinctions 
can be made does not mean that they have to be, nor that the divergence between people 
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who use those distinctions and those who do not is one of ontology. Nothing is required 
beyond competence in the language to give additional confidence that the English colour 
vocabulary itself ‘speaks correctly of the world’. To say this is not to say that something 
additional has been done to assure that the way the world is corresponds to the 
classifications of the language, for this could only be an aimless effort when the colour 
vocabulary defines (so to speak) how the distinctions that one makes ‘speak correctly’ of 
one colour or another (‘of the world’ is just a superfluous characterisation).  The fact that 
some other people do not make the colour distinctions that we do does not detract from or 
carry any implications for the fact that we make these (after all, most of us do not – could 
not – routinely make many of the colour discriminations that an English painter or printer 
needs as a matter of course: see a printer’s colour index). 
On the other hand, and just to emphasise that we do not suppose that knowing the 
language is sufficient to license empirical claims, a correct answer to the question “How 
do you know that table is four feet six inches long?” is not “I speak English”, but “I have 
measured it”.  It would, though, be nonsense for the questioner to continue: “Yes, you 
have measured it, and according to you it is four feet six inches long, but does imperial 
measurement really describe how the world is?  Perhaps the table is made of centimetres 
and millimetres instead?”.   
The most tangibly distinctive feature of Yoruba number-based practice that Watson 
(1990) reports seem to be in the standardised quantities into which commodities are 
packaged (e.g., into twenties, rather than say dozens or half dozens).  
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A Yoruba fruit-seller will quote prices for oranges in groups of five 
(osòn márùn) or twenty (ogún osòn), for in Yorubaland that is how 
oranges are generally sold. (p. 301) 
However, no one is going to suggest that oranges come naturally divided into sixes and 
twelves rather than fives or twenties, or that the difference in these units entails a 
difference in worldview. Why would someone who sells oranges in half-dozens imagine 
that they were ‘describing the world correctly’? (Even though they would surely have no 
reason, either, to worry that they were ‘describing the world incorrectly’.)  
In sum, we find it difficult to discern what Watson could mean by saying that there is “a 
right and a wrong way to talk of things and their quality”.  Watson’s whole account 
wanders unstably between arguing: 
(1) By speaking any language one cannot avoid applying an ontology. In other words, 
we, when using language correctly, are thereby automatically describing the 
world correctly (according to our supposed implicit ontology).  However, if that is 
the case, what role does the ontology play? Would it not be enough to say that we 
speak the language (correctly)? 
(2) In order to speak, one needs to be aware of what kinds of things one might be 
talking about. In other words, we, when using language correctly, are 
simultaneously thinking about what kinds of things there are in the world.  
However, this would seem to contradict Watson’s claim that the ontologies are 
“implicit” so that “we rarely become aware of them”.    
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The indiscernibility of ontologies 
The striking thing about the situation as described by Watson is that the habitation within 
different ontologies (among the English and Yoruba) seems to be a distinction without a 
(practical) difference14. Strikingly, this difference has previously gone unnoticed, which 
might seem surprising, given that there has been intense interlingual contact, translation 
and bilingualism for a long time.  Watson herself notes this: 
I have described a profound difference between use of the Yoruba 
language and that of the English language.  Why has this basic 
difference between English and Yoruba not previously been pointed 
out? There are, after all, several million people who are, to varying 
degrees, bilingual in English and Yoruba.  (Watson, 1990, p. 290; our 
emphases) 
Further 
An English-speaking person and a Yoruba-speaking person handle a 
cup of water in the same way, and they might wield a hoe in a similar 
fashion.  But, despite these similarities of physical manipulation, they 
talk of them in different ways because, in the practice of using their 
language to refer, they allocate primacy to different aspects of the 
matter they say is in the world. (p. 290) 
In other words, Watson acknowledges that the ‘profound difference’ does not show up in 
the practical lives supposedly separated by it. Watson has a ready, but not convincing, 
explanation as to why this has gone unnoticed: 
                                                 
14 Again, Watson seems to follow Quine’s theoretical scepticism: “stimulus meaning was incapable of 
deciding among ‘rabbit’, ‘rabbit stage’, and various other terms as translations of ‘gavagai’.  If by 
analytical hypothesis we take ‘are the same’ as translation of some construction in the jungle language, we 
may proceed on that basis to question our informant about sameness of gavagais from occasion to occasion 
and so conclude that gavagais are rabbits and not stages.  But if instead we take ‘are stages of the same 
animal’ as translation of that jungle construction, we will conclude from the same subsequent questioning 
of our informant that gavagais are rabbit stages.  Both analytical hypotheses may be presumed possible.” 
(Quine, 1960,  pp.71-72) 
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The explanation lies in the fact that the categorical scheme inherent in 
language is usually held unreflectively by speakers of that language – it 
is the taken-for-grantedness implicit in speaking that language.  It is not 
common for speakers of a language to examine what types of material 
objects their language commits them to.  Rather, the difference will be 
noticed as a difficulty in translation. (Watson, 1990, p.290; our 
emphases)  
Our question is this: How could people genuinely inhabit substantially different worlds 
and yet this difference not show up in the form of practical difficulties in the transactions 
between them? If there really were ‘fundamental’ differences in the underlying 
ontologies, we would imagine that providing for discrepant ontologies would by now be 
an integral and well documented feature of innumerable areas of cross-language contact.  
The practical and empirical intangibility of this supposed ontological gulf between 
languages has the marks that Wittgenstein thought identified a philosophical non-
problem: such arguments characteristically claim profound and deeply perturbing 
implications that turn out to disturb nothing and no-one since they lack any factual 
content.   
Watson’s explanation that the difference will only be noticed as though it were ‘only’ one 
of translation hardly begins to respond to this issue. It might seem minimally plausible 
that monolingual communities isolated from all other contact might naively suppose that 
their language’s ontology represents the way the world intrinsically ‘is’.  However, how 
can they continue in this supposition when they come across people who live in a 
supposedly discontinuously different world from them?  How could they fail to notice 
that other people – other languages – have discrepant ontologies, and how, therefore, 
continue to be unaware of what their own ontology is? How could bilinguals avoid 
noticing the fact that that the character of the natural world is transformed every time 
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they switch tongues?  Indeed, wouldn’t the difference be starkly manifest in the kinds of 
things their respective remarks actually say?   
Apparently, they do notice this difference, though, from Watson’s formulation it seems as 
if they do so only occasionally, even rarely, and even when they do they fail to recognise 
the true nature of the difference mistaking it (only?) for ‘a difficulty in translation’. One 
would have thought translation would exacerbate the difficulty, not diminish it, for the 
capacity of one language to capture the sense of a language postulating a discrepant 
ontology should surely need to be practically provided for. If, as Watson supposes, the 
speakers of a language suppose that their language describes the world in a ‘precisely 
correct’ way, how could those speakers possibly be comfortable with another language 
which must, by the same token, describe the fundamental nature of the world incorrectly?   
How can the fact that people are ‘worlds apart’ fail to register every time there are inter-
lingual events: shouldn’t they – somewhere - collide?   
The difference is not at the lexical level, for there are Yoruba/English dictionaries which 
register other differences between the two languages, but omit to mention this one, and 
proceed to provide straightforward Yoruba-English matches for large parts of the 
vocabulary: e.g. ‘a calabash is a utensil or container made from the dried, hollowed-out 
shell of any of these fruits’ (African Heritage Dictionary), and oko = hoe (Barber, 1984, 
p.65). 
Furthermore, and more importantly, the English and the Yoruba seem to, for all practical 
purposes, individuate in identical ways. In Watson’s own words: 
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The use of these [Yoruba] terms as subjects implies that a specific 
stimulus situation is being talked of. Here spatiotemporal situation 
becomes a defining characteristic of the sortal particular designated.  In 
this situation, sortal particularity coincides with spatiotemporal 
particularity, which results in a similarity between ó and won in 
Yoruba-language talk, and ‘it’ and ‘they’ in English-language use.  (p. 
296; our emphases) 
In other words, Yoruba speakers make the same differentiations between ten and nine 
calabashes of water as the English do.  They can tell the difference between a calabash of 
water and a lake full of water. They can taste the difference between water plain and 
mixed with orange.  They can tell that the stuff pouring off the cliff is the same as that 
splashing into the bath, and so on.    
Equally, the supposedly primary status of the sortal or the spatiotemporal cannot involve 
any difference in perceptual processing, as though Yoruba actually mentally start from 
noting the presence of dog stuff and then determine the mode of manifestation (i.e., it is 
dogstuff subdivided into separate dogforms). It is no wonder when ‘noticed’ this 
divergence of ontologies would be taken for ‘a difficulty in translation’, for the only way 
in which it could be detected is by some more-than-usual translational incongruity: 
otherwise there is nothing else in respect of the configuration of the observable scene to 
discern.  The two worlds are observationally equivalent in their individuations and 
enumerations.   
When Watson writes: 
In translation kà is usually rendered as ‘counting’, and wòn as 
‘measuring’.  We can now see that this is misleading, because the 
categorical scheme which underlies kà and wòn is quite different to that 
which underlies counting and measuring.  However, if one is happy to 
acknowledge that the basis of translation is physical operation, and not 
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be tempted to read more into it than merely that [our emphasis], we can 
see that these translations are apt. (Watson, 1990, p. 299) 
Our answer would be: Why would anyone need to read anything more into it? Who needs 
to retain a parallel track relation between what we say and what we (must) mean, as  
though the thought that ‘the basis’ of translation either is, or is not, manifest in a 
‘physical operation’. 
Conclusion 
Our argument has focussed on testing the sense of Watson’s claim that Yoruba speakers 
possess a different ontology, i.e., that they possess a different conception of what kinds of 
things make up the substructure of the observable world.  The difference postulated by 
Watson is not at the level of vernacular objects (ordinary things), i.e., the claim is not that 
the Yoruba have different dogs, oranges, or hoes than the English. Nor is the difference at 
the level of commonplace substances (what the objects are made up), e.g., a hoe made out 
of plastic versus a hoe made out of wood.  No, the difference is supposed to be on the 
ontological level and is taken to imply divergences in the understanding (as best we can 
phrase it) of the ‘order of being’ of the ultimate constituents of ordinary things.     
A crucial sub-text of our argument has been that when it comes to making cross-cultural 
comparisons social scientists rather tend to neglect the fact that such comparisons are 
unavoidably two-sided.  The urge to destabilise our own supposedly absolutist 
convictions requires dramatic disparities with the other culture’s framework of thought, 
and this encourages exaggeration, if not distortion, of what can be gleaned from the few 
arbitrarily selected and thinly described features of the other culture that are made 
available.  Often more important to these contrasts, however, is the way in which our own 
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culture is pictured, with it being assumed that some sketchily set out philosophical 
positions can adequately stand for how we think. Thus, our argument must not be 
misunderstood as insisting that the Yoruba can’t have a different ontology to us and that, 
therefore, they must have the same ontology as us. We argue, rather, that the Yoruba 
have neither the same nor a different ontology to ours because we do not have one:  there 
is no showing of why it is that, when we speak English, our speaking depends upon pre-
supposing, holding or applying this alleged ontology. This same point applies to the 
Yoruba case.  As Cook remarks with respect to Whorf’s linguistic relativism: 
[Whorf] takes it for granted that Aristotle and other philosophers have 
correctly discerned and made explicit the metaphysics contained in our 
Indo-European languages. (If they have gone wrong, it is only when 
they assume that this is the only possible, and hence the correct, 
metaphysics). [...] It never occurred to him to suspect that Aristotle and 
others may have gone wrong in seeing an implicit metaphysics in the 
grammar of Indo-European languages. (Cook, 1978b, p.6) 
The role of ontologies in the respective languages seems  akin to that of  Wittgenstein’s 
notorious ‘beetle in the box’ example: it plays no practical part in the casual 
conversations, commercial transactions, agricultural projects, games or other affairs that 
involve cross language contact and bilingualism and thus can be cancelled out (it is a 
difference that makes no difference). This, though, points to the deeper problem 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy would pose for this philosophical project of linguistic 
relativism: to show that any language can intelligibly be said to make ‘reference to the 
ultimate nature of things’. Dilman (2004) nicely summarises the reason why empiricist 
philosophers misread the structure of natural language as they do, at the same time 
highlighting the strangeness of Watson’s conception of Yoruba: 
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The empiricist philosopher goes beyond the bounds of non-
philosophical empiricism in seeking […] an ultimate justification of 
what it must be possible to attain empirically.  He mislocates the 
concept of physical reality – a formal concept – by treating it as an 
ordinary empirical concept, signifying a class of objects such as trees, 
mountains, houses etc.  (p. 172)    
As Michael Williams (2004) further explains:  
[…] ‘physical object’ is not the concept of a kind of object, like 
‘unicorn’ or ’planet’. ‘Physical object’ is a piece of logical or semantic 
vocabulary, thus unsuitable for formulating the empirical hypothesis the 
sceptic or idealist would like to express.  (p. 86) 
In other words, the expression ‘object’ is parasitic on expressions like ‘chair’, ‘orange’, 
‘bucket’ and is not one which must be acquired prior to their use (not least since the 
meaning of ‘object’ is explained by reference to chairs, tables, books, etc.). Watson’s 
account of language and, especially, of language acquisition owes much to the wholly 
philosophical picture painted in Quine’s (1960) empiricism.   
The idea that speakers of a language must posit an ontology (a metaphysical theory) in 
order to understand what they are speaking about when they make reference is also not 
worked out so far as to explain how it is that learners of a language manage to hit on the 
same ontology for a common language. That is to say, how is a child who is acquiring 
language to determine what kind of ontology underpins the referential expressions of a 
language?  After all, it is necessary for Watson, through analysing the work of predicators 
in English-language usage and Yoruba-language usage, to “infer the extension of 
designating terms used in utterances” (p. 289). So supposedly would learners of either 
language.  However, what would ensure correct inference here, especially when, as 
Watson observes:  
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People walk around and sit upon chairs, and put their arms around 
people irrespective of what they may say is in the world.  Possibly too 
they have similar pictorial images in their minds An English-speaking 
person and a Yoruba-speaking person handle a cup of water in the same 
way, and they might wield a hoe in a similar fashion. But despite these 
similarities of physical manipulation, they talk of them in different 
ways because, in the practice of using their language to refer, they 
allocate primacy to different aspects of the matter they say is in the 
world. (Watson, 1990, p. 290; our emphases) 
Watson’s argument is circular: the child learning language must postulate an ontology in 
terms of which to construe the expressions in the language, but, if ontology varies with 
language, then the child must extrapolate the correct ontology from the grammatical 
structure of that language. In short, there is no real difference between showing that two 
communities of language users speak of different things and showing that they speak of 
the same things in different ways.   
In sum from Watson’s account we learn remarkably little about the Yoruba (i.e., their 
culture and associated practices) – except that their language seems to have a different 
grammar than ours. Instead, we learn a lot about philosophical assumptions (confusions) 
of the analyst. 
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